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Protecting Race-Exclusive Scholarships from Extinction
With an Alternative Compelling State Interest
ANDRUA SAMARDZICH*
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Michigan affirmative action companion cases,' public
universities are left roiling in a sea of uncertainty, questioning the validity of the use of
race in any of their programs and policies. While the Supreme Court only examined the
use of racial classifications in affirmative action admissions programs in the Michigan
cases, the holdings from those cases have also impacted race-conscious and race-
exclusive scholarship programs. While race-conscious programs continue to hold
constitutionally defensible ground, race-exclusive programs are in greater danger of
being dismantled, and are thus the focus of this article.
Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has established a trend of applying
the rights embodied in the Equal Protection Clause with a view of society as a
collection of "Knowing Individuals."2 Under such a view, individuals are seen as
autonomous and independent, and are treated as individuals without regard to race or
other such immutable characteristics. 3 Programs that acknowledge individuals as being
part of a group or classification are strictly scrutinized under this view. Under the
current trend, administrators of race-based student financial aid programs are "opening
up [their] programs to students of all races in response to threats of legal action.'A If
the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) receives even one
complaint regarding a race-based program, it may require the school to open the
program to all prospective students and cease considering race as a factor.
5
However, race-conscious and race-exclusive scholarship programs provide
invaluable support and aid to minority students in the pursuit of higher learning.
Without such programs, many qualified minority students may be unable to attend a
higher-learning institution, thus denying all students the benefits of a more diverse
student body. While most race-based scholarship programs have succumbed to the
pressure to be racially neutral, at least one such program has resisted. There may be
some hope for preserving such a program despite the race-neutral tendencies of the
Supreme Court.
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1. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. See KEvIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA:
FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 103 (2005).
3. See generally id. at 103-28 (discussing the discourse of colorblind individualism).
4. Peter Schmidt, U. of Wisconsin Vows to Defend an Aid Program Based on Race,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 22, 2005, at A29.
5. See id.
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This hope lies in the distinction between the specific goals of affirmative action
admissions policies and race-based scholarship programs. Because the actual
compelling interest is crucial in the strict scrutiny analysis, those defending the use of
race as a factor in scholarship programs must be careful to highlight the particular
interest that is the goal of the program. Realizing the educational benefits of a diverse
student body is the compelling interest of non-remedial affirmative action admissions
policies, and this may be effectuated by admitting a critical mass of minority students.
However, the objective of achieving critical mass, in itself, effectuated by using
scholarships to attract and retain a sufficient number of minority students, should be
the compelling interest of race-based scholarship programs. By shifting attention from
diversity to critical mass, the courts will be able to narrow the focus of the strict
scrutiny analysis in regard to the use of race in scholarship programs. This shift is the
focus of this article.
First, this Note will briefly discuss strict scrutiny review generally, followed by an
account of the current jurisprudence with respect to affirmative action admissions
policies that attempt to achieve the compelling state interest of diversity. Due to a
sparse jurisprudence directly relating to race-based scholarship programs and the
strong analogy between such programs and affirmative action admissions policies, the
Department of Education stated that "using an approach that [has] been approved by
the Supreme Court as narrowly tailored to achieve diversity in the admissions context
also would be permissible in awarding financial aid."6 Part II will discuss additional
existing guidelines within which race-based programs must operate to ensure
constitutional integrity. Part III discusses why race-exclusive scholarship programs are
necessary. Part IV discusses the OCR's actions against a race-based scholarship
following a complaint. Part V considers possible defenses available to a race-exclusive
scholarship program under the existing guidelines. Part VI will conclude by showing
that achieving critical mass itself in order to realize the educational benefits of
diversity should be a compelling enough state interest to allow well-tailored race-
exclusive scholarship programs to pass the strictest scrutiny by the courts.
I. CURRENT STATUS OF RACE IN ADMISSIONS
A. Strict Scrutiny Review
"[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests."7 Dispelling a long-standing
maxim, Justice O'Connor stated in Grutter that "[sitrict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory,
but fatal in fact.'- 8 A compelling state interest is the first requirement when applying a
strict scrutiny analysis for the use of racial classifications. The Supreme Court has
established a limited number of interests that rise to the level of being a compelling
governmental interest. The Court must determine that the interest is sufficiently
6. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Notice of Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8761 (Feb. 23, 1994).
7. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
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laudable to outweigh the injury to individuals' Equal Protection guarantees as
annunciated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The use of racial
classifications inherently causes injury to these guarantees, and thus the Court must
carefully consider the reason for the use of such classifications.
Once a compelling governmental interest is furnished for the use of racial
classifications, a court will examine the means used to achieve the interest. More
specifically, a court will look to whether the means are "narrowly tailored to achieve
[the] significant governmental purpose."9 When analyzing the narrowly tailored aspect
of the use of a racial classification, a court will examine several criteria: whether the
classification is minimally intrusive, whether race-neutral means would serve about as
well as the racial classification,"I whether the use of the classification is given a limited
duration, 12 and whether the use of the classification is periodically reevaluated to
determine whether it is still necessary.' 3 If the court is satisfied that the use of racial
classifications is sufficiently limited under these criteria such that the injury incurred
by the use of such classifications is no greater than necessary to achieve the compelling
governmental interest, then the racial classification will pass strict scrutiny review.
B. Jurisprudence on the Use of Race as a Factor in Admissions
While the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to specifically address race-
based scholarship programs and no lower court has applied the Supreme Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence to race-based scholarship programs, the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence in the context of college admissions provides some
insight into how the Court might treat such programs.14 Therefore, setting out the
Court's guidelines for using racial classifications in admission policies will assist in the
later consideration of the constitutionality of race-based scholarship programs.
Even private universities do not escape the strict scrutiny of the Supreme Court's
equal protection analysis for racial classifications:
The Grutter and Gratz cases also reaffirm the Supreme Court's earlier rulings that
institutions which are covered by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
federal statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or national origin by
9. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1547 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
10. Some of the race-neutral alternatives to racial classifications include using
socioeconomic status, geographical location (but not national location), and diverse experiences.
Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Notice of Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8762.
11. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986).
12. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
13. Id.
14. BINGHAM McCuTcHEN LLP, MoRRisoN & FOERSTERLLP, & HI.ER EHRMAN WHrIE &
MCAUIFFE LLP, PRESERvING DIVERSrrY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A MANUAL ON ADMISSIONS
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AFTER THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DECISIONS 75 (2004), available
at http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/compliancemanual/Preserving-Diversity-in-Higher-
Education.pdf.
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recipients of federal funding, are subject to standards mandated under the Equal
Protection Clause when they adopt race-conscious policies. 15
To pass strict scrutiny review, a race-conscious program must first have a compelling
state interest.1 6 Diversity is the compelling interest most often used to defend
affirmative action admissions programs. Justice Powell first announced that diversity
was a compelling state interest for admissions programs in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke. 17 However, in Grutter Justice O'Connor clarified the actual
compelling state interest:
The Law School's interest is not simply "to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic
origin." That would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently
unconstitutional. Rather, the Law School's concept of critical mass is defined by
reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce. 18
In other words, the educational benefits derived from maintaining a diverse student
body are the actual compelling state interest of the affirmative action admissions
policy. With this understanding, and for the sake of simplicity, the interest will
hereinafter be referred to as "diversity."
With diversity set as the compelling state interest, the inquiry then turns to the
means used to achieve that diversity.' 9 While the Court found a rigid quota system
20unconstitutional, it distinguished rigid quotas from a floating critical mass target.
Justice Powell recognized in Bakke that a university must provide a reasonable learning
environment for minority students in order to fully realize the benefits of diversity.2' In
Grutter, the Court agreed with the characterization of "critical mass" as the point at
which a sufficient number of minority students are present to ensure that a particular
minority student will not feel like a representative of her race and will be willing to
participate in class. In other words, "critical mass" is the point at which the school fully
realizes the educational benefits of diversity.22 Critical mass is not a "number,
percentage, or range of numbers or percentages," 23 and is therefore distinguishable
from a quota system. Therefore, universities can freely consider race as a "plus" factor
when evaluating applicants in order to attain the necessary critical mass that provides
all students with the educational benefits of a diverse student body.2
4
15. REAFFIRMING DIvERsITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNIvERsrrY OF MICHIGAN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 2 n.6 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard
.edu/policy/legal-docs/Diversity_%20Reaffirmed.pdf.
16. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
17. 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
18. 539 U.S. at 329-30 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
20. Id. at 335-36.
21. Id. at 323-24.
22. Grutter, 539 at 318, 330.
23. Id. at 318.
24. Id. at 334. But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-75 (2003) (holding that a
mathematical and non-individualized point system does not satisfy the narrowly tailored aspect
of the Court's strict scrutiny analysis). Furthermore, some courts refused to accept Justice
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II. EXISTING GuIDELINEs FOR CONSTRUCTING CONSTITUTIONAL
RACE-BASED SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS
While the Court's analysis of race-conscious admissions programs may provide
some guidance, the focus of this Note is on how the Court will treat race-exclusive
scholarship programs. As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has never directly
addressed this question, but some authority has been published to establish guidelines
for considering race in scholarship programs.
In 1994, the Department of Education released a notice of final policy guidance in
the Federal Registry25 to guide universities in the process of constructing race-
conscious or race-exclusive scholarships that comply with the Equal Protection
Clause26 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 The Department of Education
listed the following factors to analyze the use of racial classification in scholarship
programs:
Among the considerations that affect a determination of whether awarding race-
targeted financial aid is narrowly tailored to the goal of diversity are (1) whether
race-neutral means of achieving that goal have been or would be ineffective; (2)
whether a less extensive or intrusive use of race or national origin in awarding
financial aid as a means of achieving that goal has been or would be ineffective;
(3) whether the use of race or national origin is of limited extent and duration and
is applied in a flexible manner; (4) whether the institution regularly reexamines its
use of race or national origin in awarding financial aid to determine whether it is
still necessary to achieve its goal; and (5) whether the effect of the use of race or
national origin on students who are not beneficiaries of that use is sufficiently
small and diffuse so as not to create an undue burden on their opportunity to
receive financial aid.28
Though not binding precedent for any court, the Department of Education based these
factors on multiple rulings of the Supreme Court.29 Under the existing system, the OCR
will order programs that do not comply with the factors listed above to alter their
policies. 30 If the university makes changes that satisfy the OCR, no legal action is filed,
and the courts never have a chance to consider the constitutionality of the program and
deliver holdings to establish guiding precedent.
Powell's opinion as binding or controlling. See generally Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,944
(5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a university may only consider race in admissions policies if it is
attempting to remedy its own previous racial discrimination). However, the Supreme Court
overruled Hopwood when it endorsed Justice Powell's opinion. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
25. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Notice of Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (Feb. 23, 1994).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (2000).
28. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8757.
29. See id. at 8762.
30. Peter Schmidt, Education Department Pressures Wisconsin to Open Scholarship
Program to White Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.admin .colostate.edu/caucus/documents/wisconsinscholarship.pdf.
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Until quite recently, no university had challenged a decision by the OCR.3' In the
face of such a long list of considerations, coupled with a general fear of litigation and
the Supreme Court's current view of society, it is not surprising that universities do not
appear to hold out hope for maintaining challenged scholarship programs.32 There may
be, however, for the continued survival of these programs. While both race-conscious
and race-exclusive programs are subject to OCR review, this Note focuses on defenses
available for race-exclusive programs.
In its notice of final policy, the Department of Education stops short of completely
prohibiting race-exclusive scholarship programs, recognizing that "important
differences" exist between admissions policies and scholarship programs, and stating
that a case-by-case analysis for race-exclusive scholarship programs is appropriate.33
However, even in the case-by-case analysis, the OCR clearly maintains discretion in
balancing the benefits of a race-exclusive program against the narrow-tailoring
requirement. A major difficulty for any university utilizing such a program will be
proving that alternative means of achieving a diverse student body are insufficient. For
instance, the Department of Education has suggested using socioeconomic status
instead of race as a factor in awarding scholarships in order to disproportionately
advantage minority students.34 In sum, although the Department of Education has
granted case-by-case review of race-exclusive scholarship programs, the OCR
maintains broad discretion to open race-exclusive scholarships to all races.
III. THE LOGIC IN ALLOWING RACE-EXCLUSIVE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS
Although the focus of this Note is not on admissions, the admissions process figures
heavily in the argument supporting the continued existence of race-exclusive
scholarships. Aside from the recruiting aspect, scholarships often only become an issue
after students have survived the admissions gauntlet. In the case of a university using
an affirmative action admission policy, scholarship consideration occurs after the use
of race in an individualized consideration of each applicant during the admissions
process. If a university used a race-conscious admissions policy to obtain a critical
mass of minority students, the university will then be faced with another difficult task:
31. See Schmidt, supra note 4.
32. The focus of this Note is limited to the private right of action generated by section 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (2000).
However, it is important to note that this is not the sole threat that forces open race-based
scholarship programs. Section 601 examines the discriminatory intent of the racial classification.
See id. Section 602 grants federal agencies the power to form regulations that implement the
provisions of § 601, including the proscription of all classifications which cause a disparate
impact. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. Thus, a program that passes constitutional muster within the
context of a § 601 complaint may not be constitutional under § 602 regulations. The Act allows
the federal government to withhold federal funding from universities that do not comply with
such regulations. Ultimately, if a federal agency, such as the Department of Justice, chooses to
implement regulations that bar racial classifications completely, whether a court would find that
a race-based scholarship program passed strict scrutiny within the context of a § 601 complaint
becomes a moot point. For further discussion of this distinction, see BROWN, supra note 2, at
239-42.
33. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761-62.
34. Id. at 8757.
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turning admission into attendance. Because the use of race as a factor was an
acceptable means of admitting minority students, it seems only logical that using race
as a factor in awarding scholarships to actually enroll and retain these same students
would also be acceptable. Not all universities, however, use affirmative action
admissions policies. Yet even in those universities, the educational benefits of a diverse
student body are an important aspect of each student's education, and race-based
scholarship programs provide necessary assistance in attracting and retaining the
minority students who are needed to achieve those benefits.
"[N]umerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes,
and 'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and
better prepares them as professionals.' 35 After Grutter, the Supreme Court left no
question that diversity is a laudable quality in a university's student body. Though a
university may be permitted to use race as a plus factor when considering individual
applicants, this alone will not suffice to ensure a diverse student body. Even if a
university can admit a critical mass of minority students, admission is not attendance.
The minority students that are admitted, whether through normal admissions or through
affirmative action admissions policies used to help attain a diverse student body, may
not attend the university due to financial restrictions or superior financial aid offered at
a different university. "One of the most important determinants for the majority of
student enrollment decisions is the receipt of financial aid."
36
Race-exclusive scholarship programs assist universities in attracting, enrolling, and
retaining admitted minority students. The Department of Education considered such an
argument, and then agreed with commentators that financial difficulties could lead to
disproportionate rejections of admission by minority applicants. 37 An additional
problem facing universities attempting to attain a diverse student body occurs when a
university is incapable of attracting a sufficient number of minority applicants to attain
a diverse student body. The Department of Education also recognized this argument
and decided that such a situation may warrant a race-exclusive scholarship program
designed to attract minority applicants. 38 Therefore, race-exclusive scholarships have a
recognized place and function within a university attempting to generate a diverse
student body, and should not fall victim to further dismantling at the hands of the OCR.
IV. How RACE-EXCLUSIVE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS ARE DISMANTLED
Since the guidelines were published in the Federal Registry in 1994, either in
response to threats of filing complaints with the Department of Education's OCR or in
negotiations with the OCR itself, many universities have opened their race-exclusive
scholarship programs to all races. 39 However, many race-exclusive scholarship
35. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,330 (2003) (quoting Brief for American Educational
Research Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 398292).
36. Geier v. Sundquist, 128 F. Supp. 2d 519, 538 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
37. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761.
38. Id.
39. See Bryan A. Keogh, 10 Universities Cut Programs for Minorities: Summer Sessions
Faced Legal Threats, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 2003, at C1, available at http://aad.english.ucsb.edu/
docs/may.2. I.html; Schmidt, supra note 4; Schmidt, supra note 30.
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programs crumble before the OCR ever gets involved. The OCR will only respond to
official complaints filed against a programY° These complaints come from a variety of
sources, including students rejected by the program, retired economics professors,4'
and organizations and groups actively targeting race-exclusive programs. 42 But even a
threat to file a complaint with the OCR often suffices to convince a university to
change a race-exclusive program. 3 Princeton University and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology both folded their minority scholarships without an OCR
investigation," while negotiations with the OCR following an investigation eventually
resulted in the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction opening its minority
scholarship. 45 Universities and other programs concede race-exclusive scholarship
programs without ever undergoing an investigation or defending their programs
designed to help minority students pursue higher education.
When the OCR investigates a complaint and determines that the program should be
changed, administrators of the program will be hard-pressed to convince the OCR that
the program should remain race-exclusive. When the OCR investigated a complaint
against the Minority Precollege Scholarship Program in Wisconsin ("the Program"),
the OCR refused to compromise.46 Kevin Ingram, the director of the Program,
attempted a host of arguments in defense of the race-exclusive requirement, 47 but the
OCR was not convinced.48 In the end, the OCR forced Mr. Ingram to rename the
Program and substitute socioeconomic status for race when considering applicants.
49
Recently, Wisconsin again grabbed the race-exclusive scholarship spotlight, but for
a completely different reason. The University of Wisconsin has decided to defend a
race-exclusive scholarship program after a retired economics professor from the
university filed a complaint with the OCR. 50 The Ben R. Lawton Minority
Undergraduate Grant Program ("Lawton Grant") was established under state law, and,
according to university spokesman Douglas Bradley, the university officials "have no
plans to change the program's eligibility requirements," since "[tihey believe they are
40. See Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on
OCR's Complaint Process, http:lwww.ed.gov/aboutloffices/listlocr/qa-complaints.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2006). Again, it is important to note that this discussion is limited to § 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but that potential initiatives enacted by federal agencies under §
602 of the Act also form a powerful threat to race-based scholarship programs.
41. Nahal Toosi, UW Grant for Minority Students Is at Issue, MILwAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Apr.
14, 2005, at B3, available at 2005 WLNR 5898888.
42. Keogh, supra note 39.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Schmidt, supra note 30.
46. Kevin Ingram, the director of the Program, argued against compromise, citing the
benefit to minority students of the existing program, the inadequacy of socioeconomic status as
an alternative factor, and the limited scope of his outreach program. Telephone Interview with
Kevin Ingram, Dir., Wis. DPI Pre-Coll. Scholarship Program (Mar. 2, 2005) [hereinafter
Interview with Kevin Ingram].
47. Id.; see supra note 46.
48. Interview with Kevin Ingram, supra note 46.
49. Id.
50. See Schmidt, supra note 4.
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on solid legal ground.",51 Though the OCR is still investigating the complaint, it seems
that this case may find its way into the court system, providing an opportunity for a
court to consider the constitutionality of race-exclusive scholarships and establish
binding precedent for all minority scholarships.
V. DEFENDING RACE-EXCLUSIVE PROGRAMS UNDER EXISTING GUIDANCE
If the University of Wisconsin does defend the Lawton Grant in court after an
adverse OCR finding, it will need substantial evidence to convince the court to
continue allowing the university to run a race-exclusive scholarship program. Without
any guiding precedent focused on the constitutionality of race-exclusive scholarships,
the university will be forced to guess what the courts will do. That guess need not be
uninformed, however. The university can always consult the Supreme Court's
affirmative action admissions policies cases for a reasonable glimpse at what type and
amount of evidence will convince the courts to allow a race-exclusive scholarship
program to continue. Under such precedent, the argument for maintaining a race-
exclusive scholarship program to promote diversity is a thin one. The Supreme Court
focused on the need for individualized consideration with race functioning as a "plus"
factor, which would certainly not be possible for a race-exclusive program. 
52
However, the differences between admissions and scholarships establish a rift
between the two that may lead the courts to treat and analyze the two differently. As
previously mentioned, the Department of Education's policy guidance does state that
race-exclusive scholarships may still be necessary in some cases to maintain a diverse
student body. 53 Further, the Supreme Court itself noted the need to apply tailored
consideration to various issues, finding that the "inquiry must be calibrated to fit the
distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public
higher education,"5 4 and also that "the very purpose of strict scrutiny is to take such
'relevant differences into account."' 55 Therefore, the strict scrutiny analysis of
scholarship programs need not be identical to that which is applied to race-conscious
admissions programs due to the inherent differences between the two. Through careful
tailoring, the possibility exists that a race-exclusive scholarship program could pass a
strict scrutiny analysis.
Recent manuals compiled by teams of lawyers and academics can also provide
guidance to aid universities and others in structuring a defense for race-exclusive
scholarship programs. The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University (the "Project")
released a manual suggesting that race-exclusive scholarship programs are not
automatically unconstitutional in light of relevant precedent, but that "narrow tailoring
would require greater attention to the burdens imposed on non-minorities, as well as
the availability of alternative policies."56 The Project also suggests that those defending
51. Id.
52. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
53. Department of Education, Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Notice of Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756,8762 (Feb.
23, 1994).
54. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-34.
55. Id. at 334 (quoting Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995)).
56. THE CivIL RIGHTs PROJECT AT HARvARD UNIV., JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTrrUTIONAL
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such programs will need less than the Court's traditional "strong basis in evidence"
requirement, but, in light of the extensive evidence submitted to the Court by briefs of
amici curiae and the trial record, the Court will still require some evidence to support
the chosen compelling interest.
57
Another manual, Preserving Diversity in Higher Education, (the "Manual") was
published by the Equal Justice Society.58 The Manual furnishes more detail on the
subject of race-exclusive scholarship programs aimed at creating diversity, and serves
as the launching point for the new potential compelling interest. The authors of the
Manual point to important limitations and constructions useful in constructing a
constitutional race-exclusive scholarship program, such as explicitly limiting the
amount of funds designated for race-exclusive use, limiting the availability of the race-
exclusive scholarship to those programs or schools within the university that are
underrepresented by minorities, and highlighting the ability of race-exclusive
scholarships to entice minority students to apply if the university is incapable of
attracting a sufficient number of minority applicants to achieve a diverse student
body.59 Additionally, the authors of the Manual highlight the fact that scholarships are
awarded "after deciding to admit," and thus, for universities using affirmative action
admission policies, the individualized consideration required under Grutter has already
been done by the time scholarship considerations begin, further supporting the
legitimacy of using race-exclusive scholarships after admission.60 Even for those
universities that do not use affirmative action admissions policies, the harm inflicted on
non-minority students by the use of racial classifications is inherently lesser than the
harm done by affirmative action admissions programs. For admissions programs, the
use of race affects the larger group of applicants, while racial classifications used for
financial aid awards are limited to the smaller group of admitted students. Afortiori, if
the Court was willing to allow the use of race classifications in admissions policies,
racial classification should be permissible for scholarship programs as well.
VI. ACHIEVING CRITICAL MASS: AN ALTERNATIVE COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
As stated by Justice O'Connor in Grutter, "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-
based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause." 61 The Manual also
refers to the necessity of narrowly tailoring the means chosen to achieve the specific
compelling interest. 62 The actual compelling interest used to justify the use of racial
classification must be narrowly defined. The Manual actually lists critical mass as a
lesser included goal of diversity, but spends little time expounding the distinction
between diversity and critical mass.63 That distinction forms the basis of the alternative
compelling interest for defending race-exclusive scholarships.
LAW SCHOLARS, REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OFTHE UNIVERSITY OFMICHIGAN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 18 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
policy/legal-docs/Diversity_%20Reaffirmed.pdf.
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, ET AL., supra note 14.
59. Id. at 83-84.
60. Id. at 83 (emphasis in original).
61. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
62. BINGHAM McCUTCHEN LLP, ET AL., supra note 14, at 83.
63. See id.
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While realizing the educational benefits of a diverse student body by means of
enrolling a critical mass of minority students is the compelling state interest of
affirmative action admissions policies, actually admitting, enrolling, and retaining the
critical mass required to achieve the educational benefits of diversity could be the
compelling state interest of race-exclusive scholarships. A court has never considered
the idea of critical mass itself being a compelling interest, but there is strong evidence
to distinguish admissions from scholarships and the different interests that each serves.
If the Supreme Court could be convinced to adopt the achievement of critical mass
itself as a compelling interest, race-exclusive scholarship programs would have a
powerful defense for their continued existence.
As the Manual and the Department of Education's Federal Registry notice both
conclude, a university needs to actually admit and retain a sufficient number of
minority students in order to realize the benefits of diversity. 64 A goal of race-
exclusive scholarships is to change admittance into attendance and retention-in other
words, to actually achieve and maintain a critical mass.65 Logically, when a university
seeks to achieve the educational benefits derived from a diverse student body, the
university should admit more minority students than are required to achieve a critical
mass with the understanding that some students will not accept the invitation to attend.
Those universities that do not use affirmative action admissions policies would still
benefit from scholarship programs that are aimed at enrolling and retaining a particular
subsection of the admitted students. A race-conscious, and particularly a race-
exclusive, scholarship program will focus on actually convincing admitted students to
attend, thus aiding in the achievement of the critical mass required to realize the
benefits of diversity. By shifting attention from diversity to critical mass itself, a court
will have a more focused view of the actual goal which race-exclusive scholarships
attempt to achieve. Although the shift may seem insubstantial, it is essential to ensure
that the strict scrutiny analysis is appropriately focused.
If a court is willing to interpret the language of Grutter as implying that achieving
critical mass is a compelling state interest, race-exclusive scholarship programs would
still need to be narrowly tailored. The analysis of the tailoring will likely follow a
similar structure to the Department of Education's published considerations listed in
Section II.66 Working backwards, the use of race must not create an undue burden on
those who are not beneficiaries of the program. 67 A university can demonstrate this by
showing the small percentage of race-exclusive scholarship programs in relation to the
number of race-neutral scholarships. "[I]n contrast to the number of admissions slots,
the amount of financial aid available to students is not necessarily fixed., 68 Since the
realm of scholarships is more expansive than that of admissions, this factor should be
easier to satisfy for scholarships than it was for admissions. Evidence showing the
expansiveness of available financial aid in comparison to the minute fraction reserved
for minorities should suffice.
64. Department of Education, Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Notice of Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8761 (Feb.
23, 1994); BINGHAM McCUTcHEN LLP, ET AL., supra note 14, at 83-84.
65. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761.
66. See supra text accompanying note 28 (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. at 8757).
67. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8757.
68. Id. at 8762.
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The next requirement, regular reassessment, can also be easily met by a regularly
scheduled assessment of whether the programs are still necessary. By limiting the
number of available race-exclusive scholarship programs and providing for the
termination of any program that is no longer necessary to achieve critical mass, a race-
exclusive scholarship program can satisfy the second consideration. These two factors
are rather easily surmounted; however, the other three may prove more difficult.
A third requirement is "whether the use of race or national origin is of limited extent
and duration and is applied in a flexible manner ... ,69 While limited extent and
duration seem to merely echo the previous two requirements, the "applied in a flexible
manner ' 7° requirement seems problematic. Race-exclusive scholarships are inherently
inflexible to a degree. Perhaps this could be partially overcome by granting
scholarships to all underrepresented minorities rather than to one particular minority
group. Another potential solution would be to focus on particular schools within the
university and grant scholarships within particular schools, such as granting
scholarships to Caucasian students who major in African-American Studies.
Ultimately, the OCR did state that some race-exclusive scholarships may be necessary,
so this requirement is not fatal.
The next factor to consider is "whether a less extensive or intrusive use of race...
in awarding financial aid as a means of achieving [critical mass] has been or would be
ineffective." 71 If the minority students were receiving a sufficient amount of financial
aid without the use of race as a factor, race would be an unnecessary consideration in
awarding scholarships. However, given the fact that so many universities currently use
race-based scholarships in one form or another in addition to any socioeconomic-based
scholarships that may apply, minority students clearly would not receive sufficient
financial aid unless scholarship programs are allowed to consider race as a factor when
awarding financial aid. Thus, the question becomes whether race-conscious scholarship
programs could function as an equivalent substitute for race-exclusive programs.
Race-conscious scholarships are not as effective at achieving critical mass as race-
exclusive scholarships. Many colleges and universities submitted comments to the
Department of Education claiming that race-conscious scholarship programs were
inferior to race-exclusive scholarships for a number of reasons. 72 In addition to the
ability to convince admitted minority students to attend and assist those students in
completing their education, race-exclusive scholarship programs also assist the
university in recruiting minority students.73 Without the ability to attract and recruit
minority students, some universities are incapable of actually admitting and enrolling a
critical mass of minority students. 74 Additionally, universities would need more race-
conscious scholarship programs in order to generate the same number of minority
financial awards that a small and limited number of race-exclusive programs could
provide. However, due to limitations of available resources, universities cannot afford
to create a sufficient number of race-conscious scholarship programs to equal the
breadth of minority financial awards generated by a smaller number of race-exclusive
69. Id. at 8757.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 8762.
72. Id. at 8761.
73. See id.
74. See id.
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scholarship programs. Race-conscious scholarships are less capable of attracting,
admitting, and retaining a sufficient number of minority students to achieve critical
mass as well as could race-exclusive scholarships. As the Court has noted, alternative
means of achieving a compelling state interest should serve the interest "about as well,"
as racial classification. 75 Race-conscious scholarships are incapable of meeting this
requirement, when compared to race-exclusive scholarships.
Justice Kennedy advanced another argument that can be used to effectively undercut
the distinction between race-conscious and race-exclusive pursuits of critical mass
through the use of scholarship programs. In his dissent to Grutter, Kennedy presented
an interesting view of the majority's holding. 6 By allowing a university to use
affirmative action programs to achieve a critical mass, the Court essentially allowed
race to become the outcome determinative factor in a certain percentage of
admissions.77 As Justice Kennedy indicates, most of the applicants to a given university
will be admitted without any consideration of race.78 The University of Michigan Law
School set its critical mass in the range of thirteen to fourteen percent. 79 As indicated
by Kennedy, the Law School admits eighty to eighty-five percent of its class based on
merit alone.80 After admitting this percentage of students, the Law School will stop
standard merit admittance in order to assess the proximity to critical mass achieved
through the normal admissions process. If only a small percentage of the admitted
applicants are members of a minority group, the university must now admit a sufficient
number of minority applicants for the remaining fifteen to twenty percent of seats in
order to meet the established critical mass. If race is only used as a minor factor, more
non-minority students will be admitted, limiting the available spots for the remaining
minority applicants that will be crucial to achieving critical mass. At some point, race
must become so great a factor as to "likely [become] outcome determinative for many
members of minority groups." 8' Therefore, "[alt this point the numerical concept of
critical mass has the real potential to compromise individual review. "82 For a certain
percentage of students, race nearly becomes the only considered factor for admittance.
This reality bears resemblance to a quota system allowing a certain percentage of race-
exclusive admission.
Although the Court allowed the school in Grutter to continue using race-conscious
admissions policies in pursuit of critical mass, Kennedy's dissent highlighted the
inevitably outcome-determinative nature of the program. Even if a school precisely
followed the majority's analysis, in order to achieve critical mass the school would be
reach a point during admissions decisions at which race becomes an outcome
determinative factor for the remaining seats. Despite this inevitable outcome, the
75. Wygant v. Jackson Bd, of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (quoting Kent
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 559, 579 (1975)).
76. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 389-90.
80. See id. at 389.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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majority affirmed such a practice. Kennedy's dissent eviscerated the majority's
requirement of individualized consideration by describing the reality of the situation.
Justice Kennedy's dissent displays the outcome determinative nature of using a
critical mass standard to determine the weight of each applicant's race in the
consideration for admittance. However, the Court went on to uphold the use of critical
mass despite Justice Kennedy's insight. Apparently, diversity-and thus the need to
achieve critical mass-may be so compelling an interest as to outweigh the harm done
by allowing race to be a large, if not outcome determinative, factor in affirmative
action admissions policies. Because the Court essentially authorized outcome
determinative consideration of race in admissions in pursuit of critical mass, one could
infer that the Court would allow the lesser harm of using race-exclusive scholarships to
further aid in achieving that critical mass.
The final consideration under the Department of Education's guidelines is whether a
race-neutral alternative would be as effective.83 As previously mentioned, the most
common substitute for race in scholarship consideration is socioeconomic status. Using
socioeconomic status as a substitute for race in pursuing a diverse student body should
be offensive to even the most casual observer. To support such an alternative, one must
assume that considering applicants based on their socioeconomic status will provide
results similar or identical to using race as a factor in awarding scholarships. The
implication underlying this argument is that by helping poor students, minority students
are inherently disproportionately advantaged. The odious nature of this substitution
does not stop at the implication that minorities are inherently poor.
By focusing on race, a university can grant scholarships or admission to minority
students who are near, though somewhat below, the normal merit level associated with
standard merit admission or scholarship award. These are the most sought-after
minority students, since they have nearly achieved the merit levels the university
normally considers acceptable for admission or award of financial aid. Even if awards
based on socioeconomic status rather than race do have the actual effect of increasing
the diversity of the student body, such programs are logically more inclined to draw
from applicants who attended inferior primary and secondary schools, and thus are less
prepared for the rigors of university learning. By pulling primarily under-prepared
minority students through socioeconomic considerations in lieu of racial consideration,
a university will likely see a lower completion rate among such a group. Not only will
the minority students who nearly meet the merit requirements of the university
contribute to the diversity of the student body, but they will also be far more likely to
succeed in the higher education setting.
Furthermore, a university is free to establish socioeconomic-based scholarships for
the laudable goal of educating those who could clearly not afford the education. Such
programs do contribute to the diversity of a student body. As Justice Powell stated in
Bakke, "[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but
a single though important element." 8 Thus, while using socioeconomic status as a
factor may disproportionately benefit racial minorities, the educational benefits derived
83. Department of Education, Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Notice of Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8757 (Feb.
23, 1994).
84. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
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from racial diversity are distinct from those of socioeconomic diversity. Though
scholarships based on socioeconomic status also benefit diversity, they should remain
separate from those programs aimed at enhancing racial diversity.
However apparent the inefficacy of substituting socioeconomic status for race may
seem, a court of law a will not likely be swayed by general observations. A court will
require documentation and evidence to prove that the race-neutral means are not as
effective in practice. "This documentation might include statistical projections of
enrollment or retention based on variations in the types of race-conscious and race-
neutral policies that could be employed., 85 When either race-exclusive or race-
conscious considerations are utilized in awarding scholarships in order to promote
diversity, the administrators of a scholarship can ensure that a particular number (in the
case of race-exclusive programs) or at least a reasonable percentage (in the case of
race-conscious programs) of minority students will receive financial aid, helping a
university to attain the critical mass of minority students needed to realize the
educational benefits of diversity. However, if a school substitutes socioeconomic status
for race, minority students will not necessarily receive a similar percentage of financial
aid as they might receive from scholarships utilizing race classifications. Statistical
documentation does exist to support the argument that socioeconomic status is not a
viable substitute for race consideration in scholarship awards.
Those who support the substitution of socioeconomic status for race are quick to
point to studies such as the one conducted by Andrew Hacker in his book Two Nations:
Black & White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal. Hacker found that 45.7 percent of black
students and 46.1 percent of Hispanic students come from families earning less than
$30,000, while only 11.8 percent of the families of white students were earning below
$30,000 from 2001-02.86 This data seems to indicate that socioeconomic status is a
viable substitute for racial classification. Nearly half of the black and Hispanic
applicants would fall into the low-income category, creating eligibility for
socioeconomic-based scholarships. However, need is not the sole factor considered in
awarding aid through a scholarship that considers socioeconomic status. Universities
must also consider merit.
By accounting for merit, scholarship programs that substitute socioeconomic status
for race as a factor will not award aid to minority students nearly as often as would a
scholarship utilizing race as a factor. When separated by race, the average SAT scores
of low-income students demonstrate the deficiency of using socioeconomic status in
place of race. The average SAT score for white low-income students in 2000 was 973,
while Hispanic and black low-income students scored 789 and 825 on average
respectively. 87 Since scholarship programs generally consider socioeconomic status in
conjunction with merit, whites would disproportionately acquire scholarships through
such programs.88 Because white students score higher in the merit category, their
applications would outweigh those of other minority students who also fall into a low-
income category. If the purpose of any particular scholarship is to create diversity in
the student body by helping minority students afford the costs of education, this
85. BINGHAM McCUTCHEN LLP, ETAL., supra note 14, at 84.
86. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK & WHITE, SEPARATE, HOsTILE, UNEQUAL 165
(Ist Scribner trade pbk. ed. 2003).
87. Id. at 164.
88. Id.
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method clearly fails to achieve that-goal. Using race as a factor or awarding aid
exclusively to minority students is substantially more effective at realizing diversity
through enrolling a critical mass than using socioeconomic status as a substitute.
When considering the sufficiency of evidence to justify the use of race over race-
neutral factors in Grutter, the Supreme Court provided some indication as to what
amount of evidence would be sufficient to justify the use of race over other race-
neutral alternatives. In defense of the race-based admissions policies in Grutter, Dr.
Stephen Raudenbush, an expert in educational analysis, provided the Court with
research indicating that if race had not been used as a factor in admissions, far fewer
minority students would have been admitted to the University of Michigan's Law
School.89 If race had not been used as a factor in admissions, minority students would
have accounted for only four percent of the entering class of 2000; because race was
considered, however, minority students accounted for just over fourteen percent of
those admitted. 9° Since the Court upheld the school's use of race in admissions
decisions, it must have found that a ten percent increase in minority admittance was
sufficient evidence to justify the use of race in the school's admissions program. A
scholarship program considering race in awarding aid should collect similar data to
justify the use of race over other race-neutral alternatives.
Furthermore, many scholarships and grants already exist to help financially
disadvantaged individuals attend institutions of higher education. These programs
serve to provide a socioeconomically diverse student body. Race-based scholarships
serve a different need, the establishment of an ethnically diverse learning environment.
"[It is an] indisputable social fact that race and ethnicity can significantly affect life
experience-just as socioeconomic status and geographic origin can significantly affect
life experience." 91 Replacing race-based scholarships with socioeconomic-based
scholarships would deprive universities of a tool specifically designed to further the
compelling state interest of achieving an ethnically diverse student body. While
socioeconomic- or "need"-based scholarships serve an important function, they do not
serve the purpose of promoting a racially diverse student body "about as well" 92 as
race-based scholarships. Therefore, such scholarships should not replace the use of
race as a factor in awarding financial aid.
To summarize, the use of racial classifications is reviewed by the courts under the
strictest scrutiny. Under this strict scrutiny review, the courts will examine whether a
compelling state interest exists for the use of racial classification, and whether that use
is narrowly tailored to the specified interest. The language in Grutter can be read to
hold either that attaining a diverse student body is the compelling interest, as
enunciated by Justice Powell in Bakke, or, paraphrasing Justice O'Connor, it can be
read to hold that the compelling interest is achieving the educational benefits of a
diverse student body by enrolling a critical mass of underrepresented minority students.
In the second interpretation, enrolling a critical mass is an inherent necessity for
89. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003).
90. Id.
91. Brief of the State of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18-
19, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
92. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ, 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (quoting Kent
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 559, 579 (1975)).
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realizing these benefits, and should itself be considered a compelling interest. In turn,
race-exclusive scholarships are a crucial part of the means used to achieve this
compelling interest. As this section has demonstrated, alternatives to race-exclusive
scholarships are not nearly as effective at attracting, enrolling, and retaining the
necessary critical mass of minority students, and race-exclusive scholarships can be
carefully constructed so as to satisfy all the criteria of the Court's narrow tailoring
requirements. Therefore, by shifting the focus from diversity to critical mass, race-
exclusive scholarships have a powerful new defense against constitutional scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
In this Note I have discussed the existing jurisprudence regarding race-exclusive
scholarship programs, and I have introduced an alternative argument for defending
such programs against constitutional attack. Scholarship programs and admissions
policies are two distinct stages with distinguishable goals in the process of admitting
and retaining students. Under strict scrutiny analysis, the means of achieving a
compelling interest must be narrowly tailored to that particular interest. While the
focus of affirmative action admissions policies is to achieve the compelling state
interest of diversity by means of achieving a critical mass, the focus of race-based
scholarship programs is to actually retain the critical mass necessary for diversity by
means of distributing financial aid to minority applicants. By limiting the extent and
duration of use of race-exclusive scholarships in the process of attracting and retaining
a critical mass of minority students, universities can narrowly tailor such programs to
achieve the compelling interest of critical mass. Therefore, limited use of the race-
exclusive scholarships can be a narrowly tailored means of achieving the compelling
state interest, should the Court adopt critical mass as a compelling state interest.
Because most race-exclusive scholarships have folded rather than face legal action,
the courts have yet to consider the constitutionality of race-exclusive scholarships. But
now the administrators of one such program have chosen to defend it, and they will
need strong arguments to convince the Court to allow the continued use of race as an
exclusive factor for awarding scholarships. This Note has examined the limited
efficacy of alternative means to achieving this compelling state interest, including using
race-conscious rather than race-exclusive scholarship programs. Race-exclusive
scholarships are simply the most effective means of achieving this goal. By offering a
limited amount of financial aid exclusively to minority students and only doing so if the
programs continue to be necessary to ensure that critical mass is realized, universities
would be able to attract and retain more of the minority students needed to achieve
critical mass and provide the benefits of diversity to all of the attending students.
Ultimately, race-exclusive scholarship programs must not be too quick to fold to
outside pressures. The Supreme Court must have an opportunity to hear arguments and
see evidence supporting the continued existence of such programs in order to establish
guiding precedent. The power to shut down race-exclusive programs is currently vested
in the hands of an administrative office, and it will continue to be unless universities
resist the OCR and defend their race-exclusive scholarship programs in the court
system. Race-exclusive scholarship programs are an integral part of a university's
ability to attract, admit, and retain minority students who bring a diversity of
experience to the university environment and enhance the higher learning experience
for all. These programs must continue to ensure diversity in higher education, and
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those defending them must be creative and persistent in order to protect race-exclusive
scholarship programs from extinction.
